Prohibition of the Egmont Group on the FIUs to disseminate information to justice entities

Abstract

The ROS (Suspicious Transaction Report) from the UIF (Financial Intelligence Unit) is the central point of my analysis, determining whether information obtained by the national UIF from foreign UIFs should or should not be included in it, and whether it should be communicated to the prosecutor's office for the respective investigation. Additionally, I explore the consequences of both including and omitting such information. The overarching goal of this work is to ascertain the relevance of the required authorization from the UIF to disseminate the information. The methodology employed is qualitative with a documentary technique, as I analyze principles 26 and 32 of the Egmont Group and Recommendation 29 of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to describe the problem, conceptualize its consequences, and theorize the solution. All of this leads me to the following conclusions: i) Prior authorization is senseless when the context of the Egmont Group principles involves information exchange. ii) Prior authorization raises legitimacy issues within a judicial process for the affected party. iii) The relevance of authorization to disseminate information should be reviewed within the working groups of FATF and Egmont.